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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
ARNOLD L. MEDINA, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 970477-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (1985), Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and State v. Troyerf 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
1995). The trial court signed the final written order of 
dismissal on July 22, 1997. R. 31. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Were the trial court's findings of fact clearly 
erroneous? 
Standard of Review. Factual findings underlying trial 
courts7 decisions to grant motions to suppress are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous standard." Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182. A 
reviewing court "will find clear error only if [it decides] that 
the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately 
supported by the record." Id. Facts are considered "in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination." Id. 
B. Given the trial court's findings of fact, did the 
court properly apply the law in concluding that the officer's 
initial suspicion of criminal activity was dispelled in the 
course of investigation prior to the frisk? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court "reviews the 
trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under a 
correctness standard, [citation omitted], according no deference 
to its legal conclusions." Id. 
C. Does the City's failure to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings require that this Court 
affirm? 
Standard of Review. When a trial court's findings are 
challenged, the party claiming that the findings are clearly 
erroneous must marshal all evidence supporting the findings and 
must then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings even when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict. See State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant/Appellee Arnold L. Medina ("Medina" or 
"Appellee") was charged by Salt Lake City ("the City") with the 
offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Salt Lake City 
Code § 11.24.020; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Salt Lake 
City Code § 11.20.040; and Carrying a Concealed Weapon, Salt Lake 
City Code § 11.48.070. Medina entered a plea of not guilty at 
arraignment to the charges on January 16, 1997. 
On April 16, 1997, Medina, through counsel, filed a 
Motion to Suppress Evidence based on lack of reasonable suspicion 
to frisk. On April 17, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing on Medina's motion. On April 22, 1997, the Honorable 
Robert K. Hilder issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law granting Medina's motion to suppress. See Addendum 
containing a copy of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
On July 9, 1997, the City indicated that the Court's 
order effectively prevented any further prosecution of the case; 
accordingly, the Court dismissed the case against Medina on 
July 23, 1997. Thereafter, the City filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 22, 1996 at approximately 12:45 a.m., Officer 
Wooldridge ("Wooldridge") was patrolling in the area of 915 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Wooldridge was employed at 
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that time as a community support division, community mobilization 
officer. R. 6. He was doing an overtime shift for DUI 
suppression and was checking the area for DUI suspects because of 
the proximity of the Durango Bar and the Red Belle Saloon. R. 9. 
Wooldridge proceeded down an alley behind the Red Belle 
driving southbound in uniform but in an unmarked police car. The 
alley was dark and the officer was driving without headlights. 
R. 10. At this time, the officer observed Medina and another 
older gentleman around a parked vehicle behind the Red Belle. 
R. 10-11. The officer noticed that Medina was trying to get into 
a parked vehicle with what appeared to be some type of tools. 
R. 11. 
Wooldridge called for backup but he proceeded to approach 
the two individuals alone. As Wooldridge approached the 
individuals, he recognized Medina. Wooldridge knew Medina as an 
employee of the Red Belle. R. 12. The officer had had previous 
discussions with Medina at the Red Belle about public licensing 
issues, recurrent problems within the area and just general 
conversation. He had never seen Medina act violently. R. 13. 
Additionally, the officer was not personally aware of Medina 
having a reputation for carrying a gun. R. 21. Neither did the 
officer have any specific valid information that Medina 
personally was violent or associated with violent groups. 
R. 21-23. 
The officer observed that the other man with Medina was 
holding a grocery bag. R. 16. As Wooldridge approached the two 
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individuals, he noted that Medina was holding both a coat hanger 
and a screwdriver. Wooldridge did not notice any other tools or 
implements of any kind. Neither did he notice any suspicious 
bulges or items in Medina's clothing. R. 14. As Wooldridge 
approached, Medina offered information that the vehicle was his 
and that he had left his car keys inside. R. 15-16. The officer 
later confirmed that the car was indeed Medina's. R. 16. The 
officer ordered both individuals to keep their hands in plain 
view and both complied. R. 28. Medina did not attempt to put 
his hands in his pockets. R. 28. As the officer searched 
Medina, the other individual was outside of the officer's view. 
R. 27. Although Wooldridge testified that he had some concern 
because he did not know the other individual in the alley, the 
officer frisked Medina, the person that was known to him first. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's factual findings were correct, not 
clearly erroneous, and were adequately supported by the record. 
In properly applying the law to those facts, the court correctly 
concluded that although the officer had a reasonable suspicion to 
initially investigate, he became aware of information prior to 
the frisk that would dispel the officer's concerns. Accordingly, 
the officer was not justified in searching Medina. 
Additionally, the City failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court, the 
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evidence was insufficient to support the findings. Affirmance of 
the trial court's order suppressing evidence is therefore 
required. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE 
PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The trial court's findings of fact were supported by the 
evidence; therefore, when applying a clearly erroneous standard, 
this Court should uphold such facts as found by the lower court. 
See Addendum. As provided by Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, a reviewing 
court "will find clear error only if [it decides] that the 
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately 
supported by the record." Id. Further, facts are considered "in 
a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." Id. 
The City erroneously argues that the trial court failed 
to evaluate the significance of uncontroverted facts. In so 
arguing, the City states that circumstantial information 
available to the officer in this case increased concern for i 
officer safety and justified the frisk. Just the opposite was 
true as properly found by the court. All of the court's findings 
of fact were amply supported by the court record. Accordingly, 
this Court should uphold the lower court's findings. 
The trial court found that on December 22, 1996, 
Wooldridge was patrolling in the area of 915 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City. See Addendum. Wooldridge proceeded down an 
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alley, which alley is notorious for criminal activity, at which 
time he observed two males apparently attempting to enter a motor 
vehicle without the use of a key. See Addendum. The court 
further found that the officer called for backup but proceeded to 
approach the two individuals alone. See Addendum. 
These findings are supported by the record. At the 
suppression hearing, Wooldridge testified that he was employed as 
a Salt Lake City Police Officer on December 22, 1996 as a 
community support division, community mobilization officer. 
R. 6. Wooldridge was doing an overtime shift for DUI suppression 
and given the opportunity with the Durango Bar and the Red Belle 
Saloon in the area he was checking for DUI suspects. R. 9. 
Wooldridge testified that he was driving southbound in 
the alley in uniform but in an unmarked police car. As he was 
going down the alley, he saw Medina and another older gentleman 
around a parked vehicle behind the Red Belle. R. 11. He 
observed Medina trying to get into the parked vehicle with what 
appeared to be some type of tools. R. 11. The officer later 
identified those tools as a screwdriver and a hanger. R. 12. 
Wooldridge did not notice any other tools or implements 
of any kind. Neither did he notice any suspicious bulges or 
items in Appellee's clothing. R. 29-30. Wooldridge did not 
recall if he was in his vehicle or if he was in the process of 
getting out of his vehicle when he called for backup. R. 18-19. 
However, he approached Medina immediately after he requested 
assistance. R. 11. 
7 
Based upon these findings, the court held that the 
officer was justified in his initial stop of Medina and his 
companion. The officer's initial observation of an 
unidentifiable person attempting to gain entry to a vehicle with 
use of a coat hanger and screwdriver in a dark alley gave the 
officer a reasonable suspicion that the person was attempting to 
unlawfully gain access to the vehicle. Therefore, the officer 
had a legitimate basis to approach the individual. See Addendum. 
However, the court found that upon approaching Medina and 
the other individual, the officer was able to identify Medina as 
an employee of the adjacent establishment. See Addendum. The 
court further found that Wooldridge had had numerous 
conversations with Medina. See Addendum. Although the officer 
knew of a criminal record, the court found that Wooldridge did 
not specifically identify any history of violence during his 
testimony. Accordingly, the court concluded that the officer's 
suspicions were dispelled. See Addendum. In so concluding that 
the officer's fears were dispelled and the need for a frisk 
dissipated, the court implicitly found that reasonable inquiries 
were warranted in this case. 
These findings were also supported by the officer's 
testimony at the suppression hearing. The officer testified that 
he recognized Medina as he approached him on foot before he 
frisked him. R. 19. The vehicle into which Medina was trying to 
gain access was located behind the Red Belle. R. 11. The 
officer further testified that he and Medina "talked aibout the 
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vehicle . . . I believe he reported it was his. He had locked 
his keys in the vehicle and was trying to get back into the 
vehicle." R. 15. When the officer was asked, "When did you ask 
him about what he was doing with the car?" he responded, "I 
believe he just volunteered that upon initial contact." 
R. 15-16. 
Further, the officer testified that he frequently 
encountered Medina at the Red Belle where he was employed. 
R. 12. At the Red Belle, they had discussed "public licensing 
issues, recurrent problems within the area . . . Just general 
conversation." R. 13. Wooldridge testified that he had spoken 
with Medina about four to seven times and Media appeared 
generally to be very amiable and willing to cooperate with him. 
R. 20. Medina had never tried to strike him or do anything 
physical toward him. R. 20. The officer was not aware of Medina 
having a reputation for carrying a gun. R. 21. The officer had 
never seen Medina act violently. R. 13. Neither did the officer 
have any specific valid information that Medina personally was 
violent or associated with violent groups. R. 21-23. 
The prosecution argues that the court's findings of fact, 
particularly the officer's prior acquaintance with Medina, 
presents a slippery slope due the familiarity being based only on 
a few prior encounters between the two. However, the fact that 
the officer knew who Medina was and knew his employment in the 
adjacent business gave credibility to Medina's statement that he 
had locked his keys in the car. The familiarity between these 
two individuals is merely one more piece to the surrounding 
circumstances to support the likelihood that Medina was telling 
the truth and was not involved in any illegal activity and to 
dispel a concern for officer safety. 
The officer did not testify to Medina acting nervous when 
confronted or attempting to get away, but instead was cooperative 
and offering information. Medina complied with the officer when 
told to keep his hands in plain view. R. 28. Medina did not 
attempt to reach into his pockets or use his tools as weapons or 
go for anything else. R. 29. 
Finally, the court found that although Wooldridge 
testified that he had some concern because he didn't know the 
other individual in the alley, the officer frisked Medina, the 
person that was known to him, first; therefore, the Court found 
that Wooldridge did not objectively evidence any heightened 
concern about the unknown person. See Addendum. 
At the hearing, the officer testified that the individual 
present with Medina was standing holding a paper bag. R. 16. 
The officer did not testify that this individual appeared in any 
way to be acting as a lookout. Additionally, there was no 
testimony that either party attempted to run upon the officer 
approaching, and, in fact, they were completely cooperative in 
responding to the officer. R. 27-28. 
Additionally, the officer did not objectively point out a 
concern for being outnumbered. While frisking Medina, he allowed 
the other gentleman to be outside his view. R. 27. If an 
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officer were concerned about the possibility of being attacked 
because of being outnumbered, he surely would not allow one 
suspect to be behind him while he addressed the other. 
Accordingly, the court properly found that the officer was not 
concerned for his safety because of the number of people present. 
The prosecution argues that because the officer in this 
case was alone, he had a basis to search both individuals for his 
safety, which concern may not have been present had other 
officers been present. However, the fact that the officer did 
not wait for backup supports the court's analysis that the 
officer was not concerned for his safety. Accordingly, the trial 
court's findings of fact were properly supported by the record 
and were not clearly erroneous. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE 
LAW IN FINDING NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO FRISK. 
In State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that 
[t]o justify a frisk, the totality of available 
information must sustain an officer's reasonable 
suspicion of both criminal activity and danger 
throughout the initial investigatory stages of 
the encounter and until the frisk actually 
commenced. In other words, even when reasonable 
suspicion is conceded as justifying the initial 
stop . . . there must be separately established 
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior when 
the frisk takes place, as well as a reasonable 
basis for believing there exists a danger to 
officers or others in the vicinity. 
Id. at 662. 
In White, police approached the defendant sitting in a 
li 
parked car with a woman in an alley. The police had previously 
been called by an informant who told police that the defendant 
had violated his parole by being involved in a domestic incident 
earlier the same day and using cocaine in the parked car. Based 
upon this report, several police surrounded the defendant, 
ordered him out of the vehicle and searched him. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of the stop and search, 
the White court first looked to the Terry holding that a frisk is 
reasonable " (1) 'where a police officer observes unusual conduct' 
which he interprets 'in light of his experience' as indicating 
possible criminal activity and present danger, (2) 'where in the 
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a 
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and (3) where nothing 
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or other's safety.'" Id. citing 
Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). 
Based upon this, the White court found and the defense 
had stipulated that the first requirement was met. The police 
officers had been made aware of possible criminal activity, and 
therefore the initial stop and investigation was appropriate. 
However, in White, the second two requirements of Terry were not 
met. Although the officers had received a report of criminal 
activity, they did not personally observe anything indicative of 
criminal conduct. The court also noted the fact that they 
approached the defendant in the day and had been given no prior 
information that the defendant was armed. Additionally, the 
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court noted the fact that the defendant appeared calm and 
cooperative. All of these factors created an environment in 
which the responding officers could question the defendant 
without fear for their safety. In doing so, the court noted that 
even "if preliminary inquiry is not required, commentary has 
indicated that . . . xIf by investigation or happenstance the 
quantum of evidence needed to justify a forcible stop has 
dissipated during this interval, then it is not permissible to 
frisk./H White, 856 P.2d 656 at 663, citing Wayne R. LaFave, 3 
Search and Seizure, § 9.4(a) at 502 (2nd ed. 1987). 
As in White, the police officer in this case had a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring and, 
therefore, had an initial basis to stop Medina to investigate. 
The officer's basis for stopping Medina was made by personal 
observation of a possible vehicle burglary. However, as in 
White, the totality of circumstances created an environment 
dispelling the initial concern and prohibiting the frisk. Here, 
the officer was able to identify Medina as someone who worked at 
the adjacent establishment, the Red Belle Saloon. The officer 
had several prior contacts with Medina and had found him to be 
generally amiable, never showing any violence toward the officer. 
The officer did not have any information that Medina was armed or 
had any reputation for carrying a weapon or for acting in a 
violent manner. 
As the officer approached, Medina volunteered that the 
vehicle was his and that he had locked his keys in the car. 
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There was no testimony that Medina acted nervous or attempted to 
get away from the officer. He complied with the officer's orders 
in keeping his hands in plain view. He did not attempt to reach 
into his pockets. The other individual with Medina was carrying 
a grocery bag, and although the officer stated that he had some 
concerns that there were two individuals against one, he allowed 
the other individual to remain out of his sight as he searched 
Medina. 
All of the information available to the officer as he 
approached Medina undermined the initial suspicion of criminal 
activity and undermined any concern for officer safety. 
Accordingly, the lower court appropriately applied the law as set 
out in Terry and White. The court properly found that the 
officer's stop of Appellee and his companion was completely 
justified but before he made reasonable inquiries, the officer 
engaged in a Terry frisk of Medina. The Court additionally found 
that a reasonable officer's fears would have been appropriately 
dispelled and that the need for a frisk dissipated before the 
frisk was undertaken. 
The City argues that this fact situation gave the police 
officer a basis for an automatic frisk. In doing so, the City 
points to the facts that the officer approached two individuals 
who appeared to be breaking into a car at night in a dark alley. 
First, the statements made by the White court regarding automatic 
frisks were dicta and not to be applied here. Additionally, the 
automatic frisk must still stand up to the standard as set forth 
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in Terry. There still must exist a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity and there must exist 
a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a danger to the 
safety of the officer or someone else. In some circumstances, 
the evidence of both is so great at the initial encounter that 
the officer may have a basis to search the individual immediately 
without having to make initial inquiry. However, this situation 
is not such a case. 
Given the totality of information available to the 
officer at the time, there was no reasonable suspicion that 
Medina was engaged in criminal activity nor that the officer's 
safety was in danger. Accordingly, this Court should ignore any 
argument regarding applying an automatic frisk to the case at 
hand. 
POINT III. THE CITY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE AND THEN DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the court's findings, the prosecution must "marshal all evidence 
supporting the [ruling] and must then show how this marshaled 
evidence is insufficient to support the [ruling] even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the [ruling]." Pilling, 875 P.2d 
at 607-608. In Pilling, the court addressed the issue of 
marshaling evidence in the case of a jury verdict. However, the 
standard is the same for a court ruling when challenging the 
court's findings. 
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In this case, the City failed to address the facts as the 
court found them. Instead, the City speculated on what 
inferences the facts could have supported. The City points to 
the fact that the officer knew Appellee worked at a local 
establishment to support the possibility of criminal activity. 
See Appellant's Brief at 20-21. This fact, given the totality of 
circumstances, supported Appellee's statement to the officer that 
the vehicle was his and he had locked his keys inside. Instead, 
the City argues that employees can often take advantage of their 
employment to commit crime. Id. This argument is entirely 
speculative, misdirected and disregards the trial court's finding 
that the officer's prior relationship with Appellee served to 
dispel fears of criminal activity and safety. Employment does 
not provide a special opportunity for an employee to break into a 
vehicle after hours. 
The City further argues that the officer's familiarity 
with Medina should not have played a role in this case and 
personal knowledge should only be relevant to the officer's 
evaluation if it is a friend of twenty years that the officer has 
seen drive his car on a daily basis down the main street at noon. 
See Appellant's Brief at 21. Again, the City speculates on these 
facts to the extreme instead of addressing them in the totality 
of circumstances in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings. Such speculation is further exaggerated in arguing 
that because of the poor lighting, there could have been a 
suspicious bulge that the officer was unable to see. The trial 
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court specifically found that the officer did not see any bulges. 
Based upon the City's failure to marshal the evidence as found by 
the Court and then state why such findings still should fail, 
this Court should dismiss the City's appeal. See Pilling, 875 
P.2d 604. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the trial court made proper findings as 
supported by the record. Such findings of fact created a 
totality of circumstances in which the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion to initially stop Medina but did not have a reasonable 
suspicion to frisk. The trial court properly applied the law, 
particularly White, in determining that a reasonable officer's 
fears would have been appropriately dispelled and the need for a 
frisk dissipated before the frisk was undertaken based upon the 
information available to the officer. Finally, the City has 
failed to marshal the evidence as found by the trial court and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the court, the evidence was insufficient to support the 
findings. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's order suppressing the evidence against Medina. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T?3 day of December, 1997. 
/ 
WMH/A (A 
TEBHANIE AMES S  
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, STEPHANIE AMES, have caused to be delivered eight 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 23 0 South 
500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies 
to the Office of the City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Room 
125, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^23 day of December, 
1997. C 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Office of 
the City Prosecutor as indicated above this day of 
December, 1997. 
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ADDENDUM 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARNOLD MEDINA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE No. 971000045 MC 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress based on no reasonable suspicion to frisk. Plaintiff was represented by Virginia 
Ward and Defendant was represented by Stephanie Ames. The Court heard the testimony of 
the arresting officer, Steven Wooldridge and heard argument of counsel. Following the 
hearing on April 17, 1997, the Court took the matter under advisement to consider case law 
proffered by counsel. Having now considered both the governing case law and the evidence, 
the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 22, 1996, Officer Wooldridge was patrolling in the area of 915 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City. 
2. Officer Wooldridge proceeded down an alley, which alley is notorious for criminal 
activity, at which time he observed two males apparently attempting to enter a motor vehicle 
without the use of a key. 
3. Officer Wooldridge called for back-up, but he proceeded to approach the two 
individuals alone. 
4. As Officer Wooldridge approached the individuals, he noted that one of them was 
defendant, Arnold Medina. Mr. Medina was known to Officer Wooldridge as an employee 
of an establishment located in the immediate area where he was observed by the officer. 
5. In addition, as Officer Wooldridge approached the two individuals, he noted that Mr. 
Medina was holding both a coat hanger and a screw driver. Officer Wooldridge did not 
notice any other tools or implements of any kind, neither did he notice any suspicious bulges 
or items in defendant's clothing. 
6. Officer Wooldridge had had numerous conversations with defendant, knew he was an 
employee of the adjacent establishment, and although he knew of a criminal record, Officer 
Wooldridge did not specifically identify any history of violence during his testimony. 
7. Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had some concern because he didn't 
know the other individual in the alley, the officer frisked Mr. Medina, the person that was 
known to him, first; therefore, the Court finds that Officer Wooldridge did not objectively 
evidence any heightened concern about the unknown person. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officer's stop of Defendant, and his companion, was completely justified based 
on the activity the officer initially observed. 
2. The officer appropriately identified himself as a policeman, but before he made 
reasonable inquiries he engaged in a Terry frisk of Mr. Medina. 
3. While a Terry frisk does not necessarily have to be deferred until reasonable inquiries 
have been conducted, a frisk is not justified if something in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for his own or other's safety. 
4. Based on the Officer's testimony, and on his fairly significant acquaintenship with 
Defendant, as well as the fact that Defendant was at a location fully justified by his 
employment, which fact was known to the officer, the Court determines that a reasonable 
officer's fears would have been appropriately dispelled and that the need for a frisk 
dissipated before the frisk was undertaken. 
5. Accordingly, relying primarily on State v. White. 856 P 2d 656 (Utah 1993), the 
Court finds that although the stop was justified, the frisk was not justified. For this reason, 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress all evidence discovered during the frisk is hereby 
granted. 
These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will constitute the order of the Court 
and no further order is required. The Court hereby requests the attorney for Defendant to 
schedule with the Court's clerk any future hearings required to resolve this matter. 
Dated this Jin day of April, 1997. 
By the Court: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to Virginia Ward, Assistant City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Stephanie Ames, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 0 F 7 day 
of April, 1997. 
